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Two experiments investigated how category information is used in decision making under
uncertainty and whether the framing of category information influences how it is used.
Subjects were presented with vignettes in which the categorization of a critical item was
ambiguous and were asked to choose among a set of actions with the goal of attaining
the desired outcome for the main character in the story. The normative decision making
strategy was to base the decision on all possible categories; however, research on a
related topic, category-based induction, has found that people often only consider a single
category when making predictions when categorization is uncertain. These experiments
found that subjects tend to consider multiple categories when making decisions, but do
so both when it is and is not appropriate, suggesting that use of multiple categories is not
driven by an understanding of whether categories are relevant to the decision. Similarly,
although a framing manipulation increased the rate of multiple-category use, it did so in
situations in which multiple-category use both was and was not appropriate.
Keywords: categories, category-based induction, decision making, framing, uncertainty
INTRODUCTION
Deciding how to act depends critically on your categorization of
the situation you are in. For example, imagine pests are eating the
strawberries and flowers in your garden. Should you build a fence
around your garden to protect it? If a local gardener told you that
your pests are very likely to be rabbits or beetles, you may have
a choice of actions to take. If you categorize the pests as rabbits,
building a fence seems like a good idea. The fence would keep the
rabbits away and you can avoid using those harsh chemicals often
used for pest control. If, instead, you categorize the pests as bee-
tles, you would not build a fence. A fence would do nothing to
protect your plants from beetles; you’ll have to use those chemi-
cals. However, given that you are not certain which of these two
categories is correct, the action you should take is not clear. You
could try to get further information—perhaps the bite marks look
a bit large to be made by beetles—but you may end up not being
certain even if you favor one pest over the other.
To make a decision when categorization is ambiguous, norma-
tively, one should take into account all possible categorizations of
the situation weighed by the likelihood that the situation belongs
to that category. That is, one should integrate information across
categories. To decide which action to choose, multiply the prob-
ability that the pests are rabbits by the probability that a fence
would be successful in protecting your garden given that catego-
rization. Next, multiply the probability that the pests are beetles
by the probability that a fence would be successful in protect-
ing your garden given that categorization. The sum of the two
products is the probability that building a fence would success-
fully protect your garden from the unknown pests1. You would do
1This calculation assumes that the categories of rabbit and beetle are mutually
exclusive and exhaustive.
this same thing for your other choice of action (using chemicals)
and select the option with the greatest likelihood of success. This
is consistent with normative principles and Bayesian approaches
in which people weight different possibilities by their prior likeli-
hoods (see Anderson, 1991, for such an approach). By considering
both categories, you may arrive at a decision that is not obvious
from either one alone. For example, if some chemical is not the
most effective solution for either beetles or rabbits but is some-
what effective for both pests, then perhaps that solution would
maximize your chance of success even if you feel that rabbits are
the most likely culprits.
This paper aims to examine how people deal with such uncer-
tainty when making decisions. Previous research in a related field,
category-based induction, has found that people often only con-
sider a single category whenmaking predictions based on category
information despite clearly knowing that the categorization was
uncertain (Murphy and Ross, 1994; Hayes and Chen, 2008; Hayes
and Newell, 2009; Murphy et al., 2012). Malt et al. (1995), Ross
and Murphy (1996), and Hayes and Chen (2008) used vignettes
about real-life situations to study induction when categoriza-
tion is uncertain. For example, one vignette might describe an
unknown person who was most likely to be a real estate agent (the
target category) but who could have been a cable repair worker
or—in a different condition—a burglar (the secondary category).
Subjects predicted the likelihood that the unknown person would
show a specific behavior, e.g., “What is the probability that the
man will pay attention to the sturdiness of the doors on the
house?” Since this behavior is more consistent with a burglar than
a cable worker, participants receiving burglar as the secondary
category should give higher probabilities than those given cable
worker as the secondary category. However, in most conditions
participants only paid attention to the target category (real estate
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agent) when making predictions, ignoring relevant information
from the secondary category. Similar results have been found in
studies using artificial categories.
The current project extends this category-based inference
research to decision making. We had two questions. First, does
decision making lead to a more rational use of multiple cate-
gories when categorization is uncertain? Second, do ideas from
the decision making literature provide new ideas on how to influ-
ence thinking in these uncertain categorization situations? In
particular, can we use framing effects, which often have large
influences in decision making, to help overcome the reliance on
single categories?
Category-based inferences are likely related to category-based
decisions, as a prediction often serves as a reason for the decision.
Choosing actions is perhaps one step more complex than pre-
dicting a property, because the action must be predicated upon
the expected properties of the uncertain object. Thus, perhaps
the results in decision making when categorizations are uncer-
tain will show the same single-category focus as in category-based
inferences. However, whereas category-based inferences ask peo-
ple to make some prediction about the future, they do not point
to any consequences about the decision. Because decision mak-
ing involves selecting an action, people may be more careful in
thinking through possible consequences. Thus, the first goal of
extending the research to decision making is not simply to gen-
eralize a body of research to another related domain, but rather
to ask whether this new domain, because it focuses on taking an
action, might lead to a very different result.
Mynatt et al. (1993) compared two tasks that they called infer-
ence and action problems in which people had to select which
evidence was most relevant to either inferring which of two cate-
gories was correct or else to deciding which of the two categories
to choose. For example, they provided subjects with some evi-
dence about a specific car and then selected more evidence in
order to either say which of two kinds of car it was (infer-
ence) or which of the two cars they would buy (action). Mynatt
et al. found, consistent with previous work on pseudodiagnos-
ticity (Doherty et al., 1979; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995), that
people did not collect comparable information about both cat-
egories when making an inference. But when making a decision
about which car to buy in the action task, people selected infor-
mation about both categories that allowed them to compare
them. This result suggests that the focus on single categories
found in our category-based induction task may not be found
in a decision-making task. However, as we shall discuss in the
General Discussion, Mynatt et al.’s design was different from ours
in important ways, so the analogy is not exact.
The second goal was to use the extension to decisionmaking to
suggest additional manipulations that might promote more nor-
mative judgments, something that has proven difficult to devise
with category-based inferences. In particular, we asked how fram-
ing of choice information influences how category information
is used in decision making under uncertainty. Research on deci-
sion making has shown that the way choices are presented can
have enormous effects on decisions, for example, loss vs. gains
framing (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1986) or implying one
or the other choice is the status quo (Johnson and Goldstein,
2003; Stanovich, 2009, ch 7). Our goal was to attempt to discover
whether use of multiple categories could be encouraged by the
organization of information. If one form leads to more normative
choices than another, this information could be used in design-
ing decision frames when people must choose between uncertain
options (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009).
To examine if framing of category information could promote
multiple-category use, we presented information in two ways. In
one way of presenting the information, the outcomes were orga-
nized by the category (the category frame); the possible choices
and their associated outcomes were listed underneath each cat-
egory. In the other organization, the information was listed by
choice (the choice frame). In the category frame, all the choices
for that category are listed together. It seems very easy to focus on
the information for one category, as information about the possi-
ble categories was physically separated. In contrast, in the choice
frame, this was not the case: Information about the two categories
was presented together for each choice. Since choices were shared
across categories, this might encourage people to combine the
information across categories, as described below. Past work on
category-based induction used displays analogous to the category
frame; to our knowledge, nothing like the choice frame has been
tested in that paradigm.
In many real-life situations, the use of categories is much
more complex than in our paradigm. Fischoff and Beyth-Marom
(1983) provided a classic analysis of Bayesian hypothesis test-
ing in which they broke down the Bayes’ rule into component
psychological processes that were required to put it into effect
(e.g., hypothesis formation, aggregating information). Our task
eliminates many of these problems. For example, we specify the
relevant hypotheses (categories), provide their base rates (pri-
ors), give all the information about their properties, and so on.
Information search is almost trivial in our task, and memory
requirements are minimal. The most relevant issue in their tax-
onomy is probably assessing the likelihood ratio: Comparing the
evidence for one hypothesis to the evidence for another. As they
point out (p. 247), the main problem in this component is that
people will often attend to the evidence for a focused hypothe-
sis and ignore the evidence for alternatives. Thus, nondiagnostic
evidence may be treated as useful, if it is associated to the target
hypothesis (as in Doherty et al., 1979). This is quite similar to
what we have found in the category-based induction case, where
evidence is derived from a target category only, even when it is not
certain.
Other work has emphasized that decisionmakingmay not take
into account all hypotheses that might be considered. Dougherty
et al. (2010) propose a model of hypothesis generation and
test in which hypotheses are first identified and then compared.
Working memory provides a limit on the number of hypothe-
ses that are considered, a number that can be reduced with task
load and other manipulations. We have also considered the issue
of working memory in the induction context (e.g., Ross and
Murphy, 1996), and while it may affect how many categories
are considered in some situations, the focus on a single cate-
gory cannot be readily explained by memory limitations, as it
falls well within working memory capacity. It seems likely that
the limit on hypothesis generation in the real-world context that
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Dougherty et al. (2010) discuss is not the same as the focus on
a single category in category-based induction. Indeed, the limits
on the numbers of hypotheses they consider (p. 317) are 2 and
4, not 1.
Another relevant issue concerns the way in which the likeli-
hood of the different categories is communicated. In much of our
previous work, the categories were visually displayed, and subjects
had to extract the base rates on their own. In the present design,
which did not use perceptual features, likelihood is communi-
cated verbally, through percentages (e.g., someone is 65% likely
to have one disease and 35% likely to have another). Use of such
probabilities may make it more difficult for people to reason cor-
rectly about the categories and their properties, as illustrated by
research on likelihoods transmitted by probabilities, frequencies,
or direct experience (e.g., Gigerenzer andHoffrage, 1995; Hertwig
et al., 2004). Furthermore, visual presentations such as those used
in our past work may be especially helpful in promoting Bayesian
reasoning (Arkes and Gaissmaier, 2012). Thus, it is possible that
people will find it more difficult to attend to and reason about
the category probabilities in the present experiment. We explicitly
addressed this possibility in Experiment 2 by making sure that
subjects had encoded and remembered those probabilities.
EXPERIMENT 1
The first goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate how people
use category information when making a decision under uncer-
tain categorization. To do this, we presented subjects with short
vignettes that involved a situation of ambiguous categorization.
Subjects had to decide what the best choice for the main character
of each story was. For example, one vignette described a situa-
tion in which a patient had to choose which medication to take
for a rash with an ambiguous diagnosis (categorization), another
described a professor who had to decide which book would
be most useful for a student but could not remember whether
the student was a business or science major. See Table 1 for an
example vignette. After making a decision, subjects answered one
comprehension question for each vignette. This was to ensure that
subjects had carefully read the information in the story.
Following the design of Murphy and Ross (2010b), we con-
structed the stories such that we could determine whether sub-
jects were basing decisions on multiple categories or on only a
single category. One choice was dominant if subjects considered
only the most likely or target category, and another choice would
be the dominant choice if subjects also considered the less likely or
alternative category in addition to the target category. In the story
in Table 1, the target category (science majors) was 65% likely,
and the alternative category (business majors) was 35% likely. If
one only paid attention to the target category, one would decide
to bring the Smith book, because it was useful for more science
majors (65% of them) than the Jones book (41%). However, if
paying attention to both categories, the best option was the Jones
book. The probability that the Jones book would be useful was
the probability of the student being a science major × the pro-
portion of science majors that find the Jones book useful plus the
same product for business majors (65%× 41%+ 35%× 78%=
54%). The same calculation for the Smith book yields a lower out-
come (65%× 65%+ 35%× 3%= 43%), thus, bringing the Jones
Table 1 | Sample story, Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B.
Story text*
Marjorie is packing her bag for the day and remembers that she has an
appointment to talk with a student from her class about career options.
She wants to bring her student a book that is relevant to her interests. The
problem is that Marjorie only has room in her bag for one book and she
can’t remember which of her students she is speaking with today, because
her calendar was erased in a computer malfunction. Her class is made up
of 65% (95%) science majors and 35% (5%) business majors. The types
of jobs they are looking for are very different. The two books (one by
Jones, the other by Smith) about careers for recent college graduates that
Marjorie has focus on different topics and are differentially useful for the
different majors.**
Please press the next button to answer a question before you see this
information and help Marjorie make a decision about what book to bring.
Category frame
SCIENCE MAJORS (MORE LIKELY)
Jones book is useful for 41% of science majors
Smith book is useful for 65% of science majors
BUSINESS MAJORS (LESS LIKELY)
Jones book is useful for 78% of business majors
Smith book is useful for 3% of business majors
Choice frame
USEFULNESS OF SMITH BOOK
Smith book is useful for 65% of science majors (more likely major)
Smith book is useful for 3% of business majors (less likely major)
USEFULNESS OF JONES BOOK
Jones book is useful for 41% of science majors (more likely major)
Jones book is useful for 78% of business majors (less likely major)
Decision question***
If you were Marjorie, which book would you take?
Jones Smith
Reading comprehension question***
What is Marjorie’s profession?
lawyer editor professor librarian
*Percentages outside of parentheses were used in the high uncertainty condi-
tion. Percentages in parentheses were used in the low uncertainty condition.
**In Experiments 2A and 2B this sentence was changed to, “The three books
(one by Jones, one by Kendall, and one by Smith) about careers for recent col-
lege graduates that Marjorie has focus on different topics and are differentially
useful for the different majors.”
***Order of answer options randomized for each subject.
book was the better choice if both possible categorizations of the
situation were taken into account.
These calculations follow the general Bayesian rule that the
prediction of each category should be weighted by its likelihood
(e.g., Anderson, 1991). However, the predictions do not depend
on such weighting, which could be computationally difficult. For
example, if people give equal weights to the categories, then they
should also choose the Jones book, because it has moderately high
success rates in both categories (i.e., the average of 41 and 78% for
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Jones is greater than the average of 65 and 3% for Smith). These
types of simple averaging strategies will, of course, not always be
successful (see McKenzie, 1994 for analysis of the performance
of various averaging strategies vs. Bayesian ones). For example, if
people arbitrarily give weights that differ greatly from the stated
probabilities, the predictions no longer hold. However, in past
research in which we have asked subjects to provide their own
probabilities for the categories, they are generally quite reasonable
(e.g., Murphy and Ross, 2010b).
The second goal of Experiment 1 was to examine how the
framing of choice information influences subjects’ propensity to
use multiple categories in decision making. To examine this issue,
we framed the provided information in two ways, by category
or by choice. The above calculations do not depend on how the
various probabilities are presented. As Table 1 suggests, the cate-
gory frame might encourage subjects to focus on the most likely
category and therefore not even notice that one of its associated
choices is not useful to the alternative category. In contrast, the
choice frame presents information about a given choice together,
putting information about the usefulness of that choice for all
possible categories together, thereby possibly encouraging people
to use multiple categories. In order to only pay attention to one
category in this frame, subjects would have to selectively ignore a
given category’s information separately for each header.
Thus far we have described what we will call the high uncer-
tainty condition. As in the example above, the multiple-category
choice is the best response in all decisions made in that condition
because there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the cate-
gorization of the situations in these stories. However, selection
of the multiple-category choice does not necessarily mean that
the subject carefully weighed the two categories or realizes that
this choice maximizes the chance of success—it could have arisen
through random choice or a suboptimal single category strategy
(see Murphy et al., 2012, Experiment 2). Thus, it is important
to understand if a manipulation that increases multiple-category
use does so in the appropriate situations. To examine this we
included an additional condition not used in previous studies,
the low uncertainty condition, in which only the information in
the target category should be considered. In the low uncertainty
condition, there was almost no uncertainty about what category
the situation belonged to. The target object was 90–95% likely to
be in the target category, so subjects should select the dominant
choice for the target category (e.g., the Smith book)2.
There are many ways to test decisions when categories are
uncertain. As described above, one technique is to use familiar
categories (e.g., real estate agent and burglar) and require sub-
jects to retrieve the necessary information from semanticmemory
(e.g., how likely real estate agents are to examine the doors on
a house). Such methods have generally found very little evi-
dence for use of multiple categories (e.g., Ross and Murphy,
1996). Providing a visual display of categories has found that
about 20–45% of subjects use multiple categories, depending on
2In the low uncertainty condition, the Smith book was 61.9% likely to be
useful and the Jones book was 42.9% likely to be successful according to the
probability calculation describes above. However, our suspicion is that people
simply ignore the much less likely category.
the materials and subject population (Hayes and Newell, 2009;
Murphy and Ross, 2010b). The present technique involves pre-
senting subjects with a table-like format of probabilities, which
controls for any differences in subjects’ knowledge and removes
any reliance on memory. Certainly, providing explicit probabili-
ties and outcomes is very common in decision-making tasks (e.g.,
gambles). However, there is a chance that the mere presentation
of these probabilities will encourage people to use multiple cate-
gories, as found in an experiment on induction that used a similar
format (Murphy and Ross, 1999). The low uncertainty condition
will help to put such a result, should it occur, into perspective.
That is, it will help to reveal whether use of multiple categories
is thoughtful or instead a response to presentation format that
occurs even when it is not appropriate.
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects in all experiments were recruited via Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Each Mechanical Turk worker was allowed
to do each study only once (workers were identified by their
worker ID). Worker IDs were recorded for each study so that
we could prevent workers from participating in more than one
of the studies reported in this paper. All subjects gave informed
consent, and the study was approved by the New York University
Institutional Review Board.
The experiment lasted approximately 10–15min and subjects
were paid for their participation. Seventy-two subjects were ran-
domly assigned to conditions in Experiment 1. Subjects had to
answer four out of the six reading comprehension questions cor-
rectly to be included in the analysis. All subjects in Experiment 1
reached this criterion.
Materials and design
The design included two between-subject factors: frame (category
frame, choice frame) and category order (target category infor-
mation presented first or second). The design also included one
within-subjects factor: category uncertainty (high uncertainty,
low uncertainty).
There were six short vignettes. A sample of one of these
vignettes is provided in Table 1 (see Supplementary Materials
online for all vignettes). The stories described a scenario in which
the main character had to make a decision about what choice
would be best given his or her situation. However, the categoriza-
tion of the character’s situation was ambiguous. For the story in
Table 1, a meeting could be either with a student who studies sci-
ence or with a student who studies business. The only difference
in the story text between the high uncertainty and low uncer-
tainty conditions was that the situation was 60–65% likely to be in
the target category in the high uncertainty condition and 90–95%
likely to be in the target in the low uncertainty condition. (We var-
ied the probabilities slightly within each condition so that subjects
would not be repeatedly answering the exact same problem.)
The stories included information about two possible choices
that the main character could take. The choices were differentially
effective for the two possible categorizations of the situation. One
choice was the dominant option for situations belonging to the
target category (for the story in Table 1, bringing the Smith book
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for science majors) and the other was the dominant choice for sit-
uations belonging to the alternative category (bringing the Jones
book for business majors). The choice that was dominant for the
alternative category was the overall best choice if basing the deci-
sion on multiple categories, thus we assumed that selection of
such a choice indicated use of multiple categories (we explicitly
confirm this in the second experiment).
There were two versions of how the choice information was
presented for each story. In the category frame, information about
each action was grouped by category (e.g., each of the majors).
That is, there was a header for each category and underneath it
the effectiveness or usefulness of each choice for that category was
listed. In the choice frame, information about each category was
grouped by choice. That is, the headers were now the names of the
choices (which book to bring) and information about the choice’s
effectiveness or usefulness for each category was listed under this
header (see Table 1 for examples). Each frame explicitly indicated
which category was most likely so that this information would
be equally salient. For each frame, there were two orders that
the category information could be presented in: Target category
information could either be presented first (on top), or second
(on bottom). The target category information is presented first in
the example shown in Table 1.
Procedure
Instructions stated that subjects would read six short stories and
make decisions about what choice the main character of each
story should make. Each story would be accompanied by infor-
mation about the possible choices that should be used in making
their decision.
Order of vignettes was randomized for each subject. Each
subject read four high uncertainty vignettes and two low uncer-
tainty vignettes. The vignettes that were assigned to each certainty
condition were counterbalanced across subjects. Story text was
presented on its own screen. Once subjects read the story, they
clicked on the “next” button with their mouse to see that infor-
mation about the possible choices (story text was also presented
on this screen). When they pressed the “next” button, a question
appeared at the bottom of the same screen that asked what choice
they would make if they were the main character in the story. The
two choices were presented below the question (order of answer
options was randomized on each trial). Subjects clicked on the
radio button next to one choice to answer.
For each story, one reading comprehension question was asked
after subjects made their decision. This multiple-choice ques-
tion was presented on a separate screen and asked about a fact
included in the story or an inference that could have easily
been made had the subject read the story. These questions were
intended to encourage close reading of the stories. See Table 1 for
an example. Trials in which subjects answered incorrectly were
excluded from analysis.
RESULTS
The dependent measure was the proportion of multiple-category
choices made in each condition. The results were subjected
to a 2× 2× 2 (Frame × Category order × Category uncer-
tainty) ANOVA. There was no evidence that framing influenced
predictions. The main effect of frame was not significant,
F(1, 68) = 1.3, p > 0.05. Category order entered into no signif-
icant effects, so all results will be presented collapsing over the
target category information presented first and second.
The results revealed that people took into account the category
likelihood when making decisions. They selected the multiple-
category response far more in the high uncertainty condition
than in the low uncertainty condition (Ms = 55.9 and 24.3%),
F(1, 68) = 38.6, p < 0.01. Note that these means show that sub-
jects often did not integrate information across category when
making decisions under uncertainty. In the high uncertainty con-
dition, subjects chose the multiple-category choices only slightly
more than half of the time. In the low uncertainty condition,
when subjects should only be paying attention to the target
category, subjects also selected the multiple-category option a
surprising amount, almost one quarter of the time.
The Category uncertainty× Frame interaction was marginally
significant, F(1, 68) = 3.0, p = 0.087. The means revealed that
subjects in the choice frame condition were more sensitive to the
certainty manipulation than those in the category frame condi-
tion. That is, those in the choice frame condition showed a greater
difference in the percent of multiple-category choices between the
high and low uncertainty conditions than those in the category
frame (see Table 2 and Figure 1).
Best choice analysis
The above analysis used the percent of multiple-category selec-
tions as the dependent measure. However, the multiple-category
choice was the best choice only in the high uncertainty condi-
tion. In the low uncertainty condition the target category was
so likely that the best choice for the target category was the
best choice overall (using a Bayesian calculation of the likeli-
hood of success for each action—see footnote 2). It is of interest
to ask which condition led to normative performance, under
Table 2 | Mean percent of multiple-category choices, Experiment 1.
Category uncertainty Category frame Choice frame Mean
Low uncertainty 32.9 16.2 24.3
High uncertainty 55.2 56.5 55.9
Mean 47.7 43.6
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FIGURE 1 | Mean percent of multiple-category choices as a function of
frame and category uncertainty, Experiment 1.
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the assumptions just described. A 2× 2× 2 (Frame × Category
uncertainty × Category order) ANOVA was performed with the
percentage of best choice selections as the dependent measure. No
interaction was significant, so we will focus on the main effects.
Subjects were 19.8%more likely to select the best choice in the
low uncertainty than the high uncertainty condition, F(1, 68) =
8.6, p < 0.01. Themain effect of framewasmarginally significant,
F(1, 68) = 3.0, p < 0.087, as subjects were more likely to select the
best choice in the choice frame. See Table 3 for details. Order of
category presentation did not influence how likely subjects were
to make the best choice, F(1, 68) = 0.4.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 revealed that subjects were not par-
ticularly good at identifying when multiple categories were and
were not relevant in making decisions. In the high uncertainty
condition, they only picked the multiple-category choice approx-
imately half of time when it was the best choice. In the low
uncertainty condition, where they should have only considered
the target category, subjects selected the multiple-category choice
almost one-quarter of the time. It seems odd that they would
be integrating information across categories when they did not
need to, given how often they did not integrate when they should
have. However, it is possible that the selection of the multiple-
category choice in the low uncertainty condition was not a result
of true consideration ofmultiple categories. Perhaps subjects were
not attending to the category base rates carefully. Some of these
multiple-category choices could have been the result of either ran-
dom choice, or mistakenly only paying attention to the alternative
category and simply picking the dominant choice for that cate-
gory. Since the dominant choice for the alternative category was
the same as the multiple-category choice there is no way to dif-
ferentiate between these two possibilities. Experiments 2A and 2B
address this issue.
As remarked earlier, it may be that the technique of present-
ing probabilities for all the outcomes in tabular form causes some
people to do some sort of averaging over all the categories whether
or not all of them should be considered. For example, if the Smith
book is useful 65 and 3% across science and business majors,
respectively, it doesn’t seem as useful (34% on average) as the
Jones book that is useful 41 and 78% of the time (60% useful
on average). But simple averaging is not always called for. If the
student is very unlikely to a business major, as in our low uncer-
tainty condition, then Smith’s book is more likely to be useful
than Jones’s (65 vs. 41% for sciencemajors). Therefore, when sub-
jects chose the multiple-category choice even when uncertainty
was low, they may have been engaging in unwarranted averaging.
This suggests that some of the 55.9% of multiple-category use in
Table 3 | Mean percent of best choices, Experiment 1.
Category uncertainty Category frame Choice frame Mean
Low uncertainty 67.1 83.8 75.7
High uncertainty 55.2 56.5 55.9
Mean 61.2 70.2
the high uncertainty condition may have arisen from the same
process. We discuss this possibility in the General Discussion.
There was a hint that how the information was framed influ-
enced how likely subjects were to pick the best choice: Subjects
were 9% more likely to select the best choice in the choice frame,
but this difference did not reach statistical significance. Clearly,
the effect is not very large, if it does exist. Additionally, subjects
were more likely to select the best choice in the low uncertainty
condition than in the high uncertainty condition. This is perhaps
not surprising as selecting the best option in the low uncertainty
condition does not involve integration of information across cat-
egories and only involves consideration of the target category
information. Thus, this finding is similar to past results from the
category-based induction literature.
EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B
Subjects may engage in a kind of probability matching in which
they choose the less likely category as the correct one in a minor-
ity of trials. In Experiment 1, the most likely choice in the
less likely category was also the one that would be selected if
subjects attended to multiple categories. To allow us to differen-
tiate true multiple-category choices from choices that were the
result of a focus on the alternative category, we added a third
choice to Experiments 2A and 2B. In these experiments there
was one choice that was dominant for the target category, one
that was dominant for the alternative category, and one that
was best if attending to both categories (analogous to a design
used with visually presented categories in Murphy et al., 2012,
Experiment 4). To further ensure that subjects’ multiple-category
choices were not the result of ignoring the category base rates, we
required subjects to correctly report them prior to making their
decision. This ensured that subjects had read and taken note of
the base rates.
Experiments 2A and 2B differed in only two ways. First,
Experiment 2B included a question about which category subjects
thought the ambiguous situation most likely belonged to prior to
the base rate question. Second, the base rate question in 2B only
asked about the most likely category. The categorization ques-
tion aimed to further ensure that subjects understood the relative
base rates of the target and alternative categories. Additionally,
this question could provide some insight into the effect of cate-
gorization on the use of multiple categories in decision making.
As literature on category-based induction has suggested that
categorizing an ambiguous item prior to making an induction
may promote single-category reasoning (Hayes and Newell, 2009;
Murphy et al., 2012), it will be important to understand its effect
on decision making. The two experiments were run separately,
but because they used the same critical questions and had similar
results, we present them together.
METHOD
Subjects
Seventy-seven subjects were randomly assigned to conditions
in Experiment 2A; data from one subject was dropped for
answering more than two reading comprehension questions
incorrectly. Ninety-nine subjects were randomly assigned to con-
ditions in Experiment 2B; data from three subjects were dropped
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for answering more than two reading comprehension questions
incorrectly.
Materials and design
The six vignettes from Experiment 1 were used. The story text
was identical to that in Experiment 1 (as shown in Table 1) except
that the stories now included information about three possible
choices that the main character could make (see Table 4). One
choice was dominant for situations belonging to the target cate-
gory (for the story in Table 1, bringing the Smith book for science
majors), one choice was dominant for situations belonging to
the alternative category (bringing the Kendall book for business
majors), and one choice was not dominant for either category.
In the high uncertainty condition, this choice (bringing the Jones
book) was the best choice overall because of the uncertainty of
categorization.
As in Experiment 1, these choices were presented in two ways,
grouped by category or by choice, as shown in Table 4, and there
were two orders that the category information could be presented,
target category information could either be presented first (on
top), or second (on bottom). As in Experiment 1, the correct cat-
egory had either high or low uncertainty. These three factors were
between-subjects manipulations.
The choices appeared in three orders: target’s dominant choice
first, alternative’s dominant choice first, or the multiple-category
choice first. We created three sets of stories such that each set con-
tained two stories from each of the possible choice orders. Each
subject was assigned one of these three sets of stories.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 1 except
for the addition of the base rate question and the most likely cat-
egory question (Experiment 2B only). In Experiment 2A, once
subjects were done reading the story, they were asked (on a
Table 4 | Sample choice information, Experiments 2A and 2B.
Category frame
SCIENCE MAJORS (MORE LIKELY)
87% Find Smith book useful
1% Find Kendall book useful
66% Find Jones book useful
BUSINESS MAJORS (LESS LIKELY)
3% Find Smith book useful
96% Find Kendall book useful
86% Find Jones book useful
Choice frame
USEFULNESS OF SMITH BOOK
Useful for 87% of science majors (more likely major)
Useful for 3% of business majors (less likely major)
USEFULNESS OF KENDALL BOOK
Useful for 1% of science majors (more likely major)
Useful for 96% of business majors (less likely major)
USEFULNESS OF JONES BOOK
Useful for 66% of science majors (more likely major)
Useful for 86% of business majors (less likely major)
separate screen) what the base rate of each category was. They
were told that the base rates of the two categories had to add to
100%. If they answered incorrectly, they were told to re-read the
story and try again. Trials in which subjects answered incorrectly
more than three times were excluded from analysis. Once they
answered the base rate question correctly, subjects read informa-
tion about the possible choices and the effectiveness or usefulness
of that choice for each category as shown in Table 4 (story text
was also presented on this screen), and the experiment proceeded
as it did in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2B, after reading each story, on a separate
screen subjects were asked which category the situation most
likely belonged to. Once they got this question correct they then
reported (on a separate screen) the base rate of the most likely
category. If subjects got the base rate question incorrect, they
returned to the story and had to answer both the categoriza-
tion and base rate question again. Any trials in which subjects
took more than three attempts to get both questions correct were
dropped.
RESULTS
Performance on the base rate and categorization questions was
high. In Experiment 2A, subjects took, on average, 1.1 attempts to
get the base rate question correct. Subjects answered 90.8% of tri-
als correctly on their first attempt. In Experiment 2B, the average
number of attempts was also 1.1, and subjects answered 92.2% of
trials correctly on their first attempt.
The results of Experiments 2A and 2B were analyzed together
with experiment (2A vs. 2B) as a between-subjects factor. A
2× 2 × 2× 2 (Frame × Category uncertainty × Category order
× Experiment) ANOVA was performed with the percentage of
multiple-category choices as the dependent measure. No interac-
tion was significant, so we focus on the main effects.
As predicted, subjects chose the multiple category action
more in the high uncertainty (M = 70.4%) than the low uncer-
tainty condition (M = 33.5%), F(1, 156) = 49.7, p < 0.01. As
with Experiment 1, subjects selected the multiple-category choice
a significant proportion of the time in the low uncertainty con-
dition when the dominant choice for the target category was the
best option. It should also be noted that subjects rarely picked the
dominant choice for the alternative category (only 1.7% of the
time).
The main effect of frame was also highly significant, F(1, 156) =
8.0, p < 0.01. Subjects chose the multiple-category choice more
in the category frame (M = 59.2%) than in the choice frame
(M = 44.5%). The main effects of experiment and category order
were not significant, suggesting that the addition of the most
likely category question and the order in which category infor-
mation was presented did not affect subjects’ propensity to use
multiple categories in their decision making (see Table 5 for
details). Although themeans in Table 5may suggest that the effect
of uncertainty differed across frames, this interaction was not
significant, F(1, 156) = 1.2.
Individual response patterns
We categorized subjects into three different groups based on
their response strategy, as shown in Table 6. Subjects were either
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Table 5 | Mean percent of multiple-category choices, Experiments 2A
and 2B.
Category Category Choice Mean
uncertainty frame frame
Experiment 2A Low uncertainty 46.3 24.2 35.2
High uncertainty 83.9 72.3 78.1
Experiment 2B Low uncertainty 42.0 24.0 33.0
High uncertainty 67.9 61.3 64.6
Mean 59.2 44.9
Table 6 | Distribution of response strategies, Experiments 2A and 2B.
Multiple-category Mixed Single-category
responders responders responders
Low uncertainty 14 30 43
High uncertainty 54 17 14
Total 68 47 57
Category frame 39 24 22
Choice frame 29 23 35
Total 68 47 57
multiple-category responders (selected the multiple-category
choice for all or all but one trial), single-category responders
(selected the target category choice for all or all but one trial), or
weremixed in their strategy (all other patterns of choices). Almost
three-quarters of subjects were consistent in their responses
(i.e., were either single- or multiple-category responders). A chi-
square test revealed that the distribution of strategies was signifi-
cantly different between the high and low uncertainty conditions,
such that more subjects in the high uncertainty condition were
multiple-category responders,χ2(2, N = 172) = 41.9, p < 0.01.
The choice patterns did not differ significantly for the category vs.
choice frame, χ2(2, N = 172) = 4.4, p > 0.05, though the dif-
ference was in the direction of moremultiple-category responders
in the category frame, as in the percentage analysis above.
Best choice analysis
A 2× 2 × 2× 2 (Frame × Category uncertainty × Category
order × Experiment) ANOVA was performed with percentage
of best choice selections (defined as in Experiment 1) as the
dependent measure. The only significant result was the Category
uncertainty× Frame interaction, F(1, 156) = 7.7, p < 0.01. As can
be seen in Figure 2, this interaction was the result of the category
frame slightly increasing (by 9%) the frequency of best choice
selections relative to the choice frame in the high uncertainty
condition but decreasing it (by 20%) in the low uncertainty con-
dition. Tests of the simple main effects of frame revealed that the
difference in percent of best choice selections between the cate-
gory frame and choice frame was significantly different in the low
uncertainty condition, t(85) = −2.8, p < 0.01, but not in the high
uncertainty condition, t(83) = 1.1, p > 0.05.
FIGURE 2 | Mean percent of best choices for each frame and category
uncertainty. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
DISCUSSION
Under high uncertainty, the category frame promoted use of mul-
tiple categories in decision making. However, the category frame
increased overall multiple-category use, both when it was and was
not appropriate. Thus, although the category frame promoted
multiple-category use, it did so at the expense of accuracy in a
situation in which only a single category is relevant to the deci-
sion. This pattern of results is surprising. Intuitively, it seems that
presenting the information about different categories together
should encourage use of multiple categories, whereas both exper-
iments found greater multiple-category use when the categories’
information was separated.
The categorization of the situation prior to making the deci-
sion did not significantly impact the amount of multiple-category
use. This is a bit surprising given that this has been found to
promote single category reasoning in category-based induction
(Hayes and Newell, 2009; Murphy et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2014).
In these past studies subjects were generally not required to
answer these questions from memory, nor were they required to
answer these questions correctly in order to move on in the exper-
iment. The procedure used in Experiment 2B may have weakened
the influence of the categorization question by quizzing the sub-
ject on the base rate of the target category, and perhaps also by
asking them a comprehension question. Subjects were never told
that we would only ask for the base rate of the target category
after each vignette (i.e., they may have thought that there was
some chance that we may ask about the alternative category at
some point) and the topic of the comprehension question varied
quite a bit. This may have caused subjects to pay more attention
to the story overall and the base rates of both categories in order
to correctly answer the questions, thus weakening the effect of the
categorization question.
Recall that in Experiment 1, the multiple-category choice was
also the best one for the alternative category, creating some ambi-
guity as to whether people were actually usingmultiple categories.
The use of three options in Experiment 2 clarified these results,
as Experiment 2 subjects very rarely chose the option that was
best only for the alternative category. Rather, they often selected
the choice that was good in multiple categories, even when one
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of those categories was very unlikely. Thus, the multiple-category
choices in Experiment 1 probably reflected true use of multiple
categories.
The proportion of multiple-category responses seemed to
increase from Experiment 1 (40% overall there, compared to 52%
here). It may be that the addition of a new option with two new
properties caused some subjects to think that multiple pieces of
information must be relevant. That is, now that there were six
percentages presented, rather than four, the tendency to focus on
only one of them may have been reduced, under the assump-
tion that more than one of the six pieces of information must be
relevant to the answer.
Finally, subjects were overall quite consistent in their respond-
ing, with 73% of them responding consistently. This cannot be
readily compared to the rates of previous work (Murphy and
Ross, 2010b), which had different numbers of items and corre-
spondingly different rules for consistency. The present design was
completely between-subjects, which no doubt encourages people
to form a strategy and stick to it. It is possible that if people had a
variety of problem types to respond to, their answers would have
been more diverse.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goals in this present research were to examine whether deci-
sion making showed the same suboptimal single-category focus
often found in category-based induction tasks and whether fram-
ing could influence use of category information. We found that
although subjects tended to choose the multiple-category choice
when it was the best option (in the high uncertainty condition),
they often selected this option when it was not the best option
as well (in the low uncertainty condition). Framing influenced
how category information was used, such that a category frame
led to greater use of multiple categories (Experiments 2A and 2B).
However, importantly, our results also revealed that this increase
in multiple-category use was indiscriminate. Overall the results
suggest that multiple-category use is often not a result of a deeper
understanding of when information is and is not relevant.
CATEGORY-BASED INDUCTION vs. CATEGORY-BASED DECISION
MAKING
This work was inspired by previous research on category-based
induction under uncertainty that has consistently found sub-
optimal use of category information (Murphy and Ross, 1994,
2010b; Ross and Murphy, 1996). The main uncertainty in both
category-based induction tasks and the present task involved
the categorization of a critical object or person. Such uncer-
tainty is certainly a common event in everyday life, as when one
doesn’t know which event will occur or which object will appear.
Nonetheless, actions often have to be taken in the absence of that
knowledge, and taking into account multiple possibilities is often
the best way to maximize performance (Anderson, 1991; but see
Huys et al., 2012 for a discussion of the utility of focusing on fewer
possibilities in decision making).
We extended our work on category-based induction under
uncertainty to a parallel decision-making task. However, such
extensions also involved a number of changes to our usual pro-
cedures. Subjects chose among actions that would be more or
less successful, depending on the correct category. In past work
on category-based induction, the choice was among properties of
the category. Referring to our original example of the unknown
pest that is eating up your garden, a category-based induction task
might ask about a property of the unknown pest (e.g., about its
size), rather than if you would build a fence or spray chemicals.
Of course, these two tasks are related, as the decisions are likely
predicated on the inferences you make (e.g., you choose to build
the fence because you have inferred that it will successfully protect
your garden based on the properties of the pest).
Another major change from the traditional category-based
induction tasks is that we explicitly provided probabilities of the
uncertain categories as well as the probability of “success” of each
choice given the category rather than requiring subjects to infer
these probabilities from displays or from memory. This way of
presenting information is similar to many decision-making tasks
that involve gambles or other uncertain choices in which proba-
bilities and outcomes are explicitly listed. We speculate that this
change in format may promote multiple-category use compared
to the formats generally used in category-based induction tasks
and may account for some of the high rate of multiple-category
use discussed in the next section.
Multiple-category use in decision making
Our first goal was to examine whether decision making under
uncertain categorization avoids the suboptimal single-category
focus often found in category-based induction research. Although
differences in the paradigms used prevent direct comparison of
their results, our results revealed that subjects in our experiments
did not tend to show the suboptimal single-category focus. The
use of multiple categories was quite high in the high uncertainty
condition, especially in Experiments 2A and 2B. This high level
of performance cannot be interpreted uncritically as indicating
accuracy, however, because of the results of the low uncertainty
condition.
When one knows the category of a critical object, one should
clearly not use information about other categories in making a
decision. For example, if one is sure that an object is a horse,
then information about cows should not influence what action
one takes toward the object3. In our low uncertainty condition, we
did not use absolute certainty but probabilities that the object was
in the target category of 90% and above. Either a general heuris-
tic of ignoring low probabilities or an actual calculation of the
best option using the probabilities would indicate that the choice
dominant in the target category would be best. Subjects who
chose the “multiple-category” choice (here somewhat misnamed
because the best choice when paying attention to multiple cate-
gories was actually the target category’s dominant choice) must
therefore have been engaging in a strategy in which they sim-
ply averaged together two probabilities whether or not they both
should have been considered.
There seem to be two possible reasons for such a strategy: fail-
ure to realize that an alternative is not relevant or failure to ignore
3Unless the action involves a property known about cows but not known
about horses. However, that was not the case for any of our items, as relevant
property information was provided for every category.
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an unlikely alternative despite noting that it is irrelevant. Failure
to notice the category base rates could result in a failure to realize
that the alternative is not relevant. If one assumed that both cate-
gories were fairly likely, then considering both would be sensible.
This is why we introduced the check of base rates in Experiment
2. On every trial, subjects had to indicate the probability of both
categories (Experiment 2A) or of the target category (Experiment
2B) so that failure to encode these likelihoods was no longer a
possibility. On a significant number of trials, people indicated
that the target category was (say) 92% likely to be correct, and
the alternative 8% likely, and then went on to give significant
weight to the alternative option, overriding the choice that would
be best for the target category. Thus, it seems that the over-use of
information from unlikely outcomes arises, at least in part, from
a failure to ignore these alternatives despite knowing (and being
required to state) that they are very unlikely.
The use of the alternative categories in these decision indi-
cates an unthinking tendency to pay attention to the information
whether or not it is truly relevant: If the display provides infor-
mation for a category, then that information will be used, even if
the category is very likely not correct. We suspect that this ten-
dency occurs much more with displays like ours that present all
the probabilities than in cases where people must retrieve infor-
mation from memory or calculate it from a display (as in our
past work, where multiple-category use was much less; Murphy
and Ross, 2010b; Murphy et al., 2012). Such displays might have
similarly undesirable effects in real-life examples as well. For
example, if an article on investments presents information for
different kinds of investors or for different market conditions,
people might well attend to all the information whether or not
it is relevant. They might conclude “sometimes stocks are better
and sometimes bonds are” even if it’s indicated that one or the
other is clearly best for their own situation or for the economy
expected in the next few years. In medical decisions, one might be
influenced by outcome statistics on conditions that are unlikely to
be the correct diagnosis (categorization) given the patient’s symp-
toms. We discuss how this research may inform such real-world
situations in the Recommendations section.
The over-use of information from unlikely outcomes has led us
to re-think how people use multiple categories in situations where
it is appropriate to do so. In asking whether people use multiple
categories, the assumption has been that they do so because of
some understanding that integrating predictions across categories
(ideally, weighted by their probability) leads to better choices than
using only a single category. But this assumption seems dubious if
people do the same thing when it leads to worse choices. Similarly,
Beyth-Marom and Fischoff (1983, Experiment 4) found that most
people who correctly identified information about an alternative
hypothesis as being relevant then provided an incorrect reason for
its relevance.
Given that the tendency to use multiple categories in the low
uncertainty condition is an estimate of the unthinking use of
multiple categories (the averaging strategy), we can estimate the
proportion of responses in the high uncertainty condition that
are due to some understanding of the principle by subtracting
this “error” from those conditions. For example, in Experiment
1, 56% of subjects selected the multiple-category option in the
high uncertainty condition, but some of these choices were very
likely due to this averaging strategy. Given that subjects used
that strategy 24% of the time in the low uncertainty condition,
when it wasn’t appropriate, this suggests that only 32% (56–24%)
of the multiple-category responses were based on appropriately
weighting the two categories in the high uncertainty condition.
The same subtraction method yields an estimate of 37% in
Experiment 2. Thus, for this paradigm, a reasonable estimate of
how often people are integrating across categories (rather than
simply averaging any numbers that are displayed) is 25–40%.
This is similar to estimates of effects in category-based induction,
which also vary across paradigms and between labs, depending on
details of the problems and subject populations (Hayes and Chen,
2008; Hayes and Newell, 2009; Murphy and Ross, 2010b). Thus,
although people tend to pay more attention to the alternative cat-
egory than they generally do in category-based induction tasks,
the rate of multiple-category use once these unthinking instances
of it are excluded does not seem very different in these two tasks.
This effect can be related to well-known examples of base-
rate neglect (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1980). We went to some effort in Experiment 2
to make sure that subjects encoded the frequency differences
between the categories by asking them to provide the relevant
category frequencies. One might well think that those questions
would serve to alert subjects to the fact that base rates were impor-
tant. However, this did not stop them from using the information
from categories that they had correctly identified as being unlikely
a third of the time. This situation contrasts with cases in which
base rates are only implicit in the question (e.g., Kahneman and
Tversky’s question about college majors), requiring subjects to
spontaneously think about the relevance of base rates and then
retrieve them. We provided the information and tested subjects
on it. More likely, this finding is a result of the salience of the
categorical information. When trying to choose a book, some
subjects examined all the information about each book that was
on the screen, regardless of its relevance. The base rate had been
tested moments ago and was no longer present—the averages for
each option were visually present. Of course, not every person
did this, but the effect is reminiscent of other forms of “mind-
lessness” we have discovered in the induction task, such as using
cues that were known to be random (Murphy and Ross, 2010a) or
focusing on categories mentioned in a question, even though the
question provided no information about the induction (Murphy
et al., 2012). Those effects were also found in a minority of sub-
jects, but they all reflect the influence of salient information that
was not actually relevant to the task at hand.
In the Introduction, we discussed an important experiment
by Mynatt et al. (1993) that directly compared induction and
decision making in an information-selection task. They found
(Experiment 1) a large difference between these two tasks on the
dependent measure of whether people adequately tested multiple
hypotheses. Their result is generally consistent with our find-
ing that people seem to use multiple categories quite often in
the present decision-making task (e.g., 60–80% of the time in
Experiment 2, high uncertainty condition, which is most analo-
gous to their situation), in contrast to earlier work on induction.
However, their task was importantly different from ours in a
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number of respects. First, the dependent measure was informa-
tion sampling, not making a prediction or choice. We provided
subjects with all the available information, whereas they required
subjects to choose which information they wished to receive
for each category. Second, the action required in their decision-
making condition was essentially a choice of one of the two
categories. For example, subjects were told about two kinds of
cars and were asked to imagine that they were going to choose
which car to buy. In our task, the choice was not between the cat-
egories but rather about actions that were associated to various
degrees with the categories. One could choose an action by look-
ing at only one category. Their task explicitly required people to
examine both categories in order to select one, which was exactly
the motivation for their prediction that people would consider
multiple hypotheses in the decision-making task.
In short, although our results are consistent with Mynatt
et al.’s, the dependent measures and information provided were so
different that the effects are by no means identical. Furthermore,
in Mynatt et al.’s design, sampling multiple categories was always
a normatively correct answer. In our design, it does not appear
normative to combine information across categories in the low
uncertainty condition, and yet people often did so, as just dis-
cussed. Thus, our results provide a new finding that could not be
discovered in Mynatt et al.’s paradigm.
As we remarked in the Introduction, our task simplifies many
of the aspects of decision making that can cause difficulties. One
important issue is that we provided all the categories, in part as
a matter of experimental control. However, in related hypothesis-
testing research, generation of the alternatives can be a significant
problem. For example, when trying to solve open-ended prob-
lems, people are not very good at providing possible actions.
Gettys et al. (1987) found that individual undergraduate sub-
jects could only generate about half of the useful actions to help
address a realistic problem. Dougherty et al. (2010) argue that
working memory limitations reduce the number of hypotheses
considered as well as increase the tendency to focus on the cur-
rent hypothesis in probability estimation. Obviously, one’s ability
to integrate information across alternatives is greatly reduced if
the alternatives are never considered to begin with. On the other
hand, when the alternatives involve categorizing a person or sit-
uation, it may be that semantic memory is sufficient to provide
access to the relevant categories. Dougherty et al.’s HyGene model
provides insight into that process. More research on open-ended
induction and decision-making problems are needed to identify
to what degree category generation is adequate in such situations.
A final connection to decision-making research is Shafir’s
(1994) analysis of disjunctive situations. In a number of studies,
he has found that people find it difficult to choose an action when
they don’t know which of two situations will occur—even when
the preferred action is identical in those situations. In one well-
known example, students expressed a desire to (hypothetically)
buy a vacation package when they knew the outcome of a major
exam, both when they knew they had passed and when they knew
they had failed. But when told that they didn’t know whether they
had passed or failed the exam, many did not choose the vacation
package (Tversky and Shafir, 1992). It seems that people do not
understand that they can come to an answer in such situations by
considering all the options and seeing if there is a predominant
choice. Toplak and Stanovich (2002) report even greater problems
for some analogous disjunctive reasoning tasks. This appears to
conflict with our finding that some subjects did combine infor-
mation across the two potential categories even when it was not
wise to do so. Again, we suspect that the visual presentation of
the options is probably responsible for this difference. If Tversky
and Shafir’s stimuli had spelled out the disjunctions, the prob-
lems would have become trivial (e.g., if you pass the exam, you
would take the vacation; if you fail, you would take the vacation;
if you don’t know whether you have passed or failed, would you
take the vacation?). Our problems were not trivial, because the
best choice was different in the two categories, but we think it is
likely that presenting the options explicitly has a strong effect on
what information people attend to.
Framing effects
The other main goal of this work was to examine whether differ-
ent ways of presenting the same information would encourage use
of multiple categories. We had the intuitive prediction that seg-
regating information by categories would encourage a focus on
the target category. After all, integrating across categories in this
display requires examining each of two or three options in the dif-
ferent categories and somehow integrating their utilities (perhaps
weighted by the categories’ probability, or perhaps not). This pre-
diction was not borne out—in fact, the opposite occurred, as the
category frame led to greater selection of the multiple-category
choice, both when it was called for (Experiments 2A and 2B) and
when it wasn’t (Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B).
We find this effect puzzling, and our explanation for it must
be tentative. One possibility is that presenting the effectiveness as
percentages created a contrast effect, especially in the choice con-
dition. Consider the choice frame inTable 4. When examining the
Smith book, subjects would see that it was particularly appropri-
ate for science majors, the most likely category: It was useful for
87% of science majors and 3% of business majors. This contrast
may have made subjects think, “This is a really good book for sci-
ence majors,” and choose it quite often. That is, the usefulness of
the Smith book for the science majors was enhanced because of
its inappropriateness for business majors. Thus, if subjects were
reasoning in this way, they would be attempting to find the best
choice for only a single category. None of the other choices have
such a striking contrast (indeed, the multiple-category choice,
Jones, goes in the opposite direction and is slightly more use-
ful for the less likely category). Of course, the striking contrast
is irrelevant when the goal is to make the best overall decision. If
Smith book is particularly inappropriate for business majors, it is
unlikely to be the best choice overall.
In the category frame, this contrast is not evident. The 87 and
3% are separated in different categories. The contrast within the
science majors doesn’t lead to a strong prediction (87% for Smith
vs. 66% for Jones), so people might examine information in the
other category, leading to more integrative predictions.
One simple way to evaluate the different frames is to con-
sider the percent of best choices statistic, in which we coded the
“best choice” as the multiple-category choice in the high uncer-
tainty case and the target-category choice in the low uncertainty
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case. As Table 6 reveals, the frames are not obviously different. In
Experiments 2A and 2B, although the category frame increased
multiple-category use when it was appropriate, it also increased
it when it was inappropriate. As a result, despite large differences
in the use of multiple categories between the frames, the over-
all percent of best choices were similar for the two frames. In
Experiment 1, the pattern is slightly different. The category frame
increased multiple-category use only when it was inappropriate,
and the percent of multiple-category choices was almost identical
when these choices were appropriate. Thus, the choice frame led
to a marginally larger percentage of best responses overall. A fair
summary of all these results is that neither frame stands out as
being significantly better than the other.
Recommendations and future directions
Overall, the results of this study are consistent with the simi-
lar research on category-based induction. Many people do not
seem aware of when they should and should not use multiple
categories. However, the overall tendency of responding was dif-
ferent here than in much of our past work. There (e.g., Ross
and Murphy, 1996; Murphy and Ross, 2010b), people generally
focused on one category even when they shouldn’t have. Here,
they often use multiple categories, even when they shouldn’t. We
suspect that the difference has to do with the presentation of
probabilities and utilities in a tabular format, which encourages
people to attempt to use as much of the information as possi-
ble. A study of induction that used a similar format (although it
required button presses to reveal the information) similarly found
that people used multiple categories (Murphy and Ross, 1999,
Experiment 6), about 59% of the time. However, that study did
not contain a low uncertainty condition and therefore was unable
to reveal that such choices might be made even when they were
not appropriate. These high levels of multiple-category use are
generally not found with pictorial displays of categories or narra-
tive presentation of common categories used in many studies of
category-based induction.
One might question, then, whether such displays are helpful
or harmful in providing people with necessary information for
making decisions. Our results suggest that they could be help-
ful to the degree that they have been filtered for the individual
to reflect possibilities and options that apply to him or her in
particular. If they contain information that should be ignored
or weighed less, people may not be very good at identifying and
ignoring it. Furthermore, as revealed by the results of Experiment
2, even if they correctly identify some information as relevant
only to unlikely outcomes, it might influence their decisions
nonetheless. As the addition of highly unlikely alternatives to a
set of possibilities has been found to change judged likelihood
of likely possibilities in a nonnormative manner (Windschitl and
Chambers, 2004), it seems that a general rule of thumb may be to
omit information from very unlikely categories.
In thinking about how to tailor information, it is important
to think about how costly errors are. Our best choice analysis
revealed two different types of error: failure to take into account
a relevant category by using a single category strategy in the
high uncertainty condition, and failure to ignore an irrelevant
category by using a multiple category strategy in the low uncer-
tainty condition. The question of how best to present category
information depends on whether it is more costly to ignore a rel-
evant category or to consider an irrelevant alternative. Of course,
which of these errors is worse depends on the costs and benefits
associated with each choice, an issue not addressed by our stimuli
(as we used novel categories and choices so that subjects would
assume the costs and benefits of each choice as equal). However,
one can argue that the use of multiple categories when only one
is relevant is worse than using only one category when multiple
ones are relevant. In the first case, one is relying on information
that may very well be wrong (a category that is likely incorrect);
in the second, one is relying on a subset of the accurate infor-
mation available. Thus, it may be unwise to attempt to increase
use of multiple options if that use is likely to be indiscriminate.
Future research should investigate how subjects integrate infor-
mation about choice costs and benefits into their decisions. This
type of information may draw attention to outcomes and lead
subjects to be more careful with their decisions. In fact, research
on category-based induction under uncertainty has shown that an
emphasis on the costs of ignoring relevant alternatives can lead to
more normative use of category information (Hayes and Newell,
2009; Zhu and Murphy, 2013).
How the inability to ignore unlikely alternatives operates in
situations where there are more categories or possibilities is an
important question for future research. In our low uncertainty
scenarios there were only two possible categories: one relevant
(target category) and one irrelevant (alternative category). In
our experiments, information from an irrelevant category was
weighed too heavily while information from relevant categories
was often not weighed heavily enough. In a situation where there
are more possibilities, one could imagine there being several rele-
vant and irrelevant categories. In such a situation, subjects may
start to discard information from some categories because the
more categories there are, the more challenging it is to consider
or average over all possibilities. Indiscriminatingly considering
presented information whether or not it’s relevant, as our sub-
jects did, could lead to irrelevant categories being considered
at the expense of relevant ones. However, it is also possible
that if more categories lead subjects to simplify their decisions,
then they will do so selectively and discard information from
less likely possibilities first. Future research will be necessary
to discover how people behave under these more challenging
conditions.
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